

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040040-0

..980

1 of 1

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/9360

22 October 1980

Korean Affairs Report

(FOUO 9/80)



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF
MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION
OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/9360

22 October 1980

KOREAN AFFAIRS REPORT

(FOUO 9/80)

CONTENTS

SOUTH KOREA

POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

Rise of Chon Tu-hwan, Pak Chong-hui Compared (ASAHI SHIMBUN, 31 Aug 80).....	1
Pak's Daughter Rumored Active Behind Political Scene (SHUKAN SHINCHO, 4 Sep 80).....	8

ECONOMY

Briefs	
Declining Role of Exports	13
Alternative Energy Sources	13
Large LPG Stockpile Facilities	14
State of Small-Medium Businesses	14

FOREIGN RELATIONS

ROK Unwilling To Disclose Complete Text of Kim's Trial (THE JAPAN TIMES, 7 Oct 80).....	15
Briefs	
Fukuda's Remarks on Kim	16
Meeting With Indian Ambassador	16

NORTH KOREA

SOCIAL CONDITIONS

Japanese Visitor Reports on Life in DPRK, Political Situation (Akira Ishikawa; MAINICHI SHIMBUN, 24-26 Aug 80).....	17
---	----

- a -

[III - ASIA - 109 FOUO]

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

S. KOREA/POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

RISE OF CHON TU-HWAN, PAK CHONG-HUI COMPARED

Tokyo ASAHI SHIMBUN in Japanese 31 Aug 80 p 4

[Article by Korean Affairs Team of Foreign Reporters Dept: "Rise of President Chon Tu-hwan Similar to Pak's Coup; Strong Dissatisfaction in People's Minds; 'No Successive-Term Presidency' Pledge"]

[Text] The inaugural ceremony of Chon Tu-hwan to the presidency of South Korea, elected by the provisions of the Yushin Constitution, a legacy of President Pak Chong-hui, is scheduled to take place at Chamsil gymnasium in Seoul at 11 o'clock on the morning of 1 September. While a striking resemblance is seen between the late President Pak Chong-hui, who took the power through a military coup d'etat in the early dawn hours of 16 May 1961, and President Chon Tu-hwan in their motives for taking power, in the methods applied in the U.S. reaction against it, and in their political ideology, a great difference exists between them in the process of taking power, the lineup of their close associates, and the reaction of the South Korean people to the change. The difference points up the 19-year time lag between the two coups d'etat. On the eve of President Chon's inauguration, we are attempting to forecast the future of the Chon Tu-hwan power system through a comparative study of the "Pak Chong-hui coup" and the "Chon Tu-hwan coup."

The Coup and Its Main Actors

At 3 o'clock on the morning of 16 May 1961, about 3,600 soldiers rapidly took control of the capital city of Seoul. By 6 o'clock they had occupied the radio station and announced the Military Revolutionary Committee's six-item revolutionary public declarations, including a "stronger anti-communist stand," and "alliance with friendly nations in the free world," and a "sweeping cleanup move against corruption and old ills." A series of decrees was issued one after another: emergency martial law, a freeze on financial transactions, dissolution of the national congress, a ban on all political activities by political parties and groups, and the arrest of cabinet ministers. The coup was a breathtaking success. On the 18th the cabinet of Chang Myon resigned en masse, and the following day, the 19th, the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction was inaugurated,

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

with full control of the three branches of the government, including the judiciary, legislative and executive authorities.

Sense of Crisis Among Military Men

The chief engineers of the coup were the young officers of the 8th class of the military academy who formed the "main forces of the revolution." [The reason] behind the move, were the corruption by the politicians and military leaders, the chronic poverty of the peasants, and the DPRK, which had waged various "offensives" against the south from a position of economic strength, then superior to that of South Korea. These factors were disturbing to the military men, who held anticommunism and national security as matters of the foremost importance. The plans to carry out the coup were carefully formulated, and the actions to follow the takeover were also well planned. As a result, the coup de grace was successfully delivered with a single fatal blow.

On the other hand, the "military clean-house coup" of 12 December last year, which gave President Chon Tu-hwan the chance to take over the government, came as a countermove against "gradual democratization," the mainstream of social change brought about in the aftermath of the death of President Pak Chong-hui on 26 October last year. Maj Gen Chon Tu-hwan and his colleagues shared the sense of crisis that "democratization" would not only threaten South Korea's national security but might also invite North Korean intervention.

Economic conditions in South Korea could not avoid the shock effect of the second oil crisis. Despite the 18 years of great advance under the Pak regime, the country was suffering from the rise in oil prices, inflation, export snags, an international trade deficit, and recession. High economic growth, registering a nearly 10-percent annual growth rate, has come to an end; in its place the complications from such fast growth have emerged. The concerns of common people with their daily lives, particularly labor disputes, tend to stir up trouble. Against this "crisis of establishment" in the political, economic, and social spheres, the military men tried to apply military-like strong remedial measures, which resulted in the "12 December incident." But the incident was not concluded in a single blow fashion. First of all, it had its origin in the unexpected incident of the killing of President Pak Chong-hui. Therefore it started under passive circumstances.

The personnel involved in the incident of 12 December, led by Chon Tu-hwan, commander of the Army Security Command, included No Tae-u, commander of the 9th Division; Chong Ho-yong, commander of the Airborne Forces (both were Chon's classmates at the 11th class of the Military Academy); Cha Kyu-hon, commander of the Capital City Garrison Command; Hwang Yong-si, commander of the I Corps; and Yu Hak-song, assistant deputy chief of logistics, Department of Defense. These officers were senior to Chon Tu-hwan. Troops under their command arrested many military leaders, including Chong Sung-hwa, martial law commander. However, the "12 December incident" stopped short

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

with the securing of leadership within the military establishment itself. Therefore, the civilian government of Choi Kyu-hu was allowed to continue functioning.

United States Extends Recognition in the End

Commander Chon took the next step. First, on 14 April this year, still in uniform, he assumed the post of acting director of the KCIA so as to secure a position within the cabinet and attend the cabinet meetings. On 17 May he had emergency martial law extended to cover the entire country; arrested Kim Tae-chung, former presidential candidate from the New People's Party, and Kim Chong-pil, president of the Democratic Republican Party; and placed Kim Yong-sam, president of New People's Party, under house arrest. Thus he drove the "three Kims," all presidential hopefuls, off the stage, bringing the "12 December incident" to a successful conclusion. It was on 31 May, after the Kwangju area was brought under control, that Chon was installed as chairman of the Standing Committee of the National Security Council. This move firmly established his power in both name and substance. His National Security Emergency Council was comparable to the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction of Pak Chong-hui's 16 May coup.

The nucleus of the Chon Tu-hwan power structure was formed by the generals who had participated in the 12 December uprising. They were either Chon's classmates of the 11th class at the Military Academy or fellow officers from his birthplace of Kyongsang Province. In other words, his power is based on his academic and geographic background. General Chon has been closely watching the moves within the military from the vantage point of being commander of the Army Security Command, and he has stepped up the work of personnel assignments aimed at consolidating his own power. But the unity among the leaders under Chon is seen by many as smaller in size and weaker in strength than the "8th class" group of the past, who shared a strong sense of comradeship among themselves.

The attitude of the United States toward General Chon Tu-hwan during the process of his bid for power was clearly reminiscent of that toward Pak Chong-hui's 16 May coup d'etat. At that time, the United States promptly issued a statement in support of the Chang Myon regime. General Magruder, commander of U.S. Forces in Korea, and Ambassador Green met with President Yun Po-sun and urged him to suppress the coup by throwing frontline troops into Seoul, but President Yun hesitated to make the decision, and this allowed the coup to succeed. The United States at first treated the troops involved in the coup as "insurgents" and started to suppress them, but as soon as Major General Pak appeared to have gained majority support, the United States turned to extend its recognition. On 22 June, 6 days after the coup, Secretary of State Rusk publicly announced U.S. support of Pak.

The United States was furious when Commander Chon Tu-hwan moved the troops from the 9th Division of the III Corps, stationed near the armistice line in a position that is vital to the defense of Seoul, in order to throw

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

them into the 12 December operation, without the approval of the commanding general of the U.N. Command, who has sole operational control over all troops in Korea. But later, the United States again turned to give it de facto recognition. In August the announcement by General Wickam, commanding general of U.S. Forces in Korea, that the "United States supports the inauguration of Chon Tu-hwan to the presidency" accelerated the mood in South Korea for welcoming the birth of President Chon. The State Department still shows open displeasure over the leadership of Chon Tu-hwan; however, the situation appears to be largely stabilized unless an incident such as the execution of Kim Tae-chung takes place.

South Korean People and the Future

There is a great difference in the reaction of the South Korean people toward the military takeovers of Pak Chong-hui and Chong Tu-hwan. At the time of 16 May revolution, the opposition Democratic Party had been given the opportunity to run a "free" government, following the student revolution of 19 April 1960. As a result, street demonstrations continued and cabinet ministers were repeatedly shuffled. When the military coup came, strong opinions such as "we cannot help but turn politics over to the military" was voiced in some quarters, and an air of welcome could be detected among the people.

Dark Shadow of Kwangju Incident

On the other hand, General Chon and his colleagues forcefully suppressed the "aspirations of the people for freedom" and the "desire for a process of democratization" that prevailed widely among the people after the death of President Pak. The South Korean people have a strong desire for stability on the one hand and harbor strong dissatisfactions against the suppression of the desire for freedom on the other. Further, although the 16 May incident was a bloodless coup, General Chon has on his hands the bloody record of the Kwangju incident, which resulted in the death of many people--189 by government accounts alone. It is undeniable that this record casts a dark image in the minds of the people against the Chon Tu-hwan control system. Korea has an enduring tradition of Confucian teachings, and the resulting pattern of thought places civilian officials over and above military servicemen in the government ranking. In the case of President Chong, he is not only a military man but also a young man, which, in the context of the Confucian teaching "respect the elders," adds another dimension of negative image. All in all, the people look at him critically.

President Pak applied a tight control over his governing body but at the same time gave his people the dream of high economic growth. President Chon is promoting a social purification campaign, through the elimination of politicians and high government officials who amassed illicit fortunes and a ban on private tutorship, but these measures are too limited in scope to be called a national dream. In an address on the 22nd, at a ceremony marking his retirement from the military as a full general, prior to his presidential inauguration, President Chon set the direction

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

of his administration: "Our ideal is to build a democratic welfare state that all of our people desire." He elaborated on the means to achieve the goal and presented his three-point principles: 1. Indigenous growth of democracy suitable to the historical environment and cultural background of Korea. 2. Construction of a welfare society in which each individual may enjoy material as well as spiritual well-being. 3. Establishment of social justice through widespread social innovations.

The above statement is similar to the "Korean-style democracy" announcement by President Pak under the Yushin system. The new motto, "Democratic welfare state," seems to suggest that [the administration] will assume the new tasks of rectifying differences in income level brought on by high-speed economic expansion and of advancing social development projects. At the same time, President Chon stated in his address that "a tradition for a peaceful changeover of government will be established." This was a criticism of President Pak's long tenure in office. At the time of the 16 May incident, Maj Gen Pak Chong-hui's military commission members promised publicly, in the last item of their six-part revolutionary public pledge, "when our task is achieved, we will relinquish and transfer governmental power to new and conscientious politicians at any time and will prepare to return to our original duties." But the promise was not kept. Major General Pak was promoted to full general before retiring from the service and was elected to the presidency in the October 1963 presidential election, defeating candidate Yun Po-sun. This was what he called "transferring the government to a civilian."

Later, President Pak changed the provisions in the constitution stating that "the term of the President shall be limited to two terms and 8 years," ran three times, and went on to be a three-term President, defeating Kim Tae-chung. In 1972, he pushed for "October Yushin," abolished the clause in the constitution prohibiting a multiterm Presidency, and established a "lifetime administration."

In a Matter of a Moment

President Chon ascended to the presidency right on the heels of President Pak. Immediately after the "military clean-house coup," he made a comment, "I don't know at all what politics is all about. I became a soldier because I like being a soldier. I don't intend to take off my uniform." Nonetheless, he went on to be inaugurated president in a breathless pace which rivaled in speed President Pak's ascendancy.

According to the draft of the revised constitution currently under study by the panel of the Constitutional Revision Study Commission, the terms of the President are limited to 7 years, and no successive term in office is allowed. The earlier statement by President Chon was a reference to the revision of the draft, but few in Korea are thought to take it at face value, because the situation in South Korea is too fluid and turbulent to forecast the future--especially the next 7 years.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Personnel Ties of President Chon Tu-hwan
President Chon Tu-hwan (Military Academy 11th Class)

Nucleus

Pak Se-sik	Military Academy 12th Class Commander, Capital City Security Command	Junior Class Member
Cha Kyu-hon	Military Academy 8th Class Deputy Chief of Staff, Army	Senior Group Member
Hwang Yong-si	Military Academy 10th Class Commander, Third Army	Senior Group Member
Yi Hi-song	Military Academy 8th Class Commander, Martial Law Command	Senior Group Member
Chong Ho-yong	Military Academy 11th Class Commander, Airborne Forces Command	Same Class Member
No Tae-u	Military Academy 11th Class Commander, Military Security Command	Same Class Member

Support Group

Yi Kyu-kwang	Uncle of Chon Tu-hwan's wife President, Mineral Resources Development Company	Relative
Yi Ung-hi	Chief Presidential Spokesman, Former editor of TONGA ILBO	Presidential Adviser
Kim Pyong-hun	Chief Presidential Protocol Officer	Presidential Adviser
Chong Tong-Ho	Chief Presidential Bodyguard	Presidential Adviser
Kim Kyong-won	Chief Presidential Secretary	Presidential Adviser
Kim Pok-tong	Military Academy 11th Class Superintendent, Military Academy	Same Class Member
Chin Tong-chae	Military Academy 8th Class Commander, Second Army	Senior Group Member
Yun Song-min	Military Academy 9th Class Commander, First Army	Senior Group Member

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Paik Sok-chu	Military Academy 8th Class Deputy Commander, U.S.-ROK Forces	Senior Group Member
Yu Pyong-hyon	Military Academy 7th Class Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff	Senior Group Member
Yu Hak-song	Military Academy 9th Class Director, KeIA	Senior Group Member

COPYRIGHT: ASAHI SHIMBUN TOKYO HONSHA 1980

9364
CSO: 4105

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

S. KOREA/POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

PAK'S DAUGHTER RUMORED ACTIVE BEHIND POLITICAL SCENE

Tokyo SHUKAN SHINCHO in Japanese 4 Sep 80 pp 40-42

[Article: "A Report on Former President Pak's Oldest Daughter's Grudge and Scandal"]

[Text] "This is a story circulating in the power centers of South Korea." Such was the beginning of the story. Former President Pak had three children, a son and two daughters, by his late wife, who was killed by Mun Se-kwang in 1974. The eldest daughter, Kun-hye, has turned 30 years of age, and after her mother's death, she acted as first lady for her father. She is said to have missed the chance of marriage because of the duty.

The story went: "At the tragic death of her father, the daughter strongly wanted revenge. She wanted to get to the bottom of the incident. She felt that the incident was not merely the work of Kim Chae-kyu, former director of the KCIA, or of Kim Kye-won, presidential chief secretary. She could not help but be suspicious of Chong Sung-hwa, army chief of staff, who was in the vicinity at the time of the assassination."

As for the 26 October incident of President Pak's assassination, it was generally believed that Kim Chae-kyu felt a strong hatred for Cha Chi-chol, chief presidential security guard and, at the same time, had become disgusted with the president himself for favoring Cha. Fearful of losing Pak's favor, Kim Chae-kyu seized the opportunity to commit the criminal act during a dinner reception at a branch office of the KCIA, according to the story. But newly obtained information sees the view that Kim Chae-kyu harbored animosity toward the "arrogant" Cha, who was rapidly gaining power, as being superficial.

The new story goes: "Kun-hye disliked Cha. After Cha came to Chongwadae (the official presidential residence), the atmosphere there changed drastically, and no one was allowed to see the President without Cha's approval, regardless of how close the visitor might be to the President. Furthermore, Cha volunteered to provide women to the widower President. As a result, the life of the President in his later years was ravaged with scandals. Kun-hye was very much upset over all of this.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

"But it was really Kim Chae-kyu behind the whole scheme, manipulating Cha to do these things. Cha probably did not realize that he was being used by Kim. Cha was very much a simple-minded individual. Cha began to have the illusion that he had become a great man, and he started to interfere with even personnel matters in the military. Disruption of the communication flow between the President and the people outside was what Kim Chae-kyu was aiming at. After all, when the President was killed, Cha was no longer useful to Kim, and a simple-minded person would be an obstacle. Therefore, Cha was also eliminated."

Another scheme of Kim Chae-kyu involved Kim Kye-won's assignment to be chief presidential secretary, according to the information. But we will not dwell on it here, since it would open up a whole new dimension. However, the recommendation for Kim Kye-won's assignment was said to have come from both Kim Chae-kyu and Cha Chi-chol--another point that disputes the argument about severe friction between Kim and Cha. Anyway, Director Kim carried out the assassination. On the same day, he had attempted to cause the presidential helicopter to crash, but the malfunction in the equipment was discovered beforehand and so Kim chose to shoot the President himself. He was incorrect in thinking that he could handle the situation following the killing, but he had felt confident of American support and believed he could get the military to support him after the assassination. In order to accomplish this, strict silence about the death of the President would have to be enforced for 3 days while the reorganization of the structure of power was taking place. After a period, anyone could be accused of the murder of the President.

The story continues: "At the time, the United States wanted to see President Pak eliminated. The successor that the U.S. Government wanted was Chong Sung-hwa. After the death of Pak, the Yushin system was being deactivated, but Kim Chae-kyu could not survive. He became a scapegoat. After Pak's death, Chong Sung-hwa stood at the pinnacle of power as the commander of the Martial Law Command. Opposing the move was Pak Kun-hye."

Financial Aid to Chon Tu-hwan Group

Chon Tu-hwan is a graduate of the 11th class of the Military Academy. The 11th class was the beginning of the formal 4-year course at the Military Academy in South Korea. The classmates are said to share a strong sense of being an elite group, and they were united behind General Chon at the time of the 12 December "military housecleaning coup d'etat." Before and after the incident [President Pak's assassination], one man acted in a very suspicious manner: Army Chief of Staff Chong Sung-hwa had to be one of the enemies involved with the death of her father who took over power. When Kun-hye saw this happening, she approached Chon Tu-hwan, commander of the Army Security Command.

Among the members of the 11th Class, there were individuals who enjoyed President Pak's special favor. Chon was of course one of them. The others were: Lt Gen No Tae-u, who assumed the post of commander of the Army Security

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Command after Chon; Kim Pok-tong, superintendent of the Military Academy; and Son Yong-gil, who was said to be the most brilliant student among them, but who had fallen from favor in 1973. Chon Tu-hwan was given the credit, when he was the commander of the 1st Division, for discovering the third underground tunnel dug by the North Koreans under the 38th Parallel. His promotion was said to have been partially aided by the pulling of strings by Chief Presidential Security Guard Cha. Chon had once served with Cha in the Kimpo airborne unit, and in 1974 he served as assistant to the chief of the Presidential Security Guard, at the recommendation of Cha. Back in 1961, when then Maj Gen Pak Chong-hui led his coup, Chon was the leader of demonstrations at the Military Academy in support of Pak.

The story concludes: "Anyway, Chon Tu-hwan was extremely loyal to President Pak. This man was the commander of the Security Command at the time of the assassination. In other words, he was chief of army security and police and, after the incident, he was placed in charge of the joint investigation of the incident. For Kun-hye, he was the most trustworthy man who could be found. Later, the 12 December incident took place, and Chong Sung-hwa and others were ousted, but according to a confidential report circulating among the central power system of South Korea, the Chon Tu-hwan group was given financial aid by Pak Kun-hye prior to the 12 December incident. In this connection, a rumor has it that the relationship between Chon Tu-hwan and Miss Pak is extraordinary--to the point of being closely bordering that between a man and a woman. The takeover by Chon Tu-hwan came about as a result of a power struggle fought inside the power structure, or a coup within the royal court, but behind the fighting the alliance with Kun-hye was said to have played a role."

A source in Japan analyzed the story: "In South Korea, a popular joke at the moment is the 'U.B. News Agency.' In the Korean language, a wild rumor is called 'yu-on-bi-o,' which is shortened to 'U.B.' The story of the scandal must have come from the 'U.B. News Agency.' After the assassination, Chon Tu-hwan's name became known and people began to ask about him. The vicious rumor may have started because he was closely associated with President Pak and his family. On the other hand, Miss Kun-hye performed the duties of first lady after her mother's death by attending official meetings, presiding over the Semaun movement (Note: spiritual revitalization movement), and keeping herself busy with speaking engagements and moving from east to west. But Korea is a Confucian country which regards women's active participation in affairs of state with a negative view, particularly when Kun-hye was only a young girl, unlike her middle-aged mother Madame Yuk Yong-suk. Thus Kun-hye was not too popular among the people. You may find a parallel in case of Marie Antoinette, who at the time of the French Revolution was made into a heroine of pornography [as published]. Both have been used as objects for fun and games of catharsis by people."

The same source raised two points as the basis for refuting the scandalous rumor. One of them was the arrest of Kim Chong-pil. The wife of Kim is the niece of former President Pak. If Kun-hye had that much influence over Chon Tu-hwan, she would not have allowed Kim Chong-pil to suffer such a terrible

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

shame in a country like Korea, where bloodkinship is very highly regarded, extending to the level of 10th-cousin relationship. The second point is likewise creditable. There is a man named Ham Pyong-gi who was ambassador to Canada at the time of the 26 October incident. He is the husband of President Pak's daughter from an earlier marriage before Madame Yuk. Mr Ham was also arrested. He was later released, and his release may have been due to Kun-hye's intervention with Chon.

Did the Rumor Originate With Chon's Close Associates?

Pak Kun-hye is a Catholic and wanted to become a nun after the death of the President. She does not seem to be the type of woman who would want political power. An intelligent woman who graduated at the top of her class at Sogang University with an electronics engineering major, she appears to have made no effort to line up her own political power base. Many Korean observers attribute the element of Chon's success to the position he happened to occupy at the time of crisis: commander of the Security Command. Some say that General Chong Sung-hwa's lack of decisive action--he is nicknamed "Incompetent"--may have contributed to Chon's success. General Chong, finding himself in the position of supreme power as commander of the Martial Law Command, started shuffling military personnel in an attempt to consolidate his power. But the change in the top did not filter down to the level of young generals and colonels, who hold the real power and who turned to Chon Tu-hwan.

General Chong's forces planned Chon's forced retirement or reassignment from the Security Command, but then suffered a preemptive strike by Chon and lost the power struggle. Since then, nearly 40 generals reportedly have been forced to retire or have been reassigned. Former Japanese Ambassador to South Korea Kaneyama said: "In the background of the appearance of Chon, there is the people's distrust of politicians. The politicians demand democratization, in denial of the past, but "the general public and the military are worried about the confusion that may follow democratization and the freedom movement."

The truth of any information from South Korea is difficult to screen from the false. A simple judgment may lead to misinterpretation. "Kim Tae-chung being the symbol of democratization is, therefore, good; and Chon Tu-hwan being the embodiment of repression is, therefore, bad"--such a simplistic determination is not always correct. At the same time, it is true that the repressive government of Chon Tu-hwan is creating an uneasy feeling among the people, causing them to wonder where it is all leading. "We don't like all this" is how the people think of it. But referring to the "royal court scandal," an authority on Korean affairs stated: "It is entirely possible. I have also heard about it from a sure source--one on the inside in Chon's power system,"

"Korea, both North and South, is a country where people hold blood kinship in extremely high esteem, beyond the imagination of the Japanese people today. When power is passed on, the successor must first secure the

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

blessings of the predecessor. Since President Pak met sudden death, a representative of the surviving family members acts on behalf of the President and gives the blessing to the successor. This is merely a matter of commonsense well within the norm of Confucian society. The family representative in this case was Miss Pak Kun-hye. The enemy of the parent is unconditionally recognized [as the object for elimination] in the context of Korean morality. Therefore, if Kun-hye asked Chon Tu-hwan for "help," it would reinforce Chon Tu-hwan's position. I think the fact that the story of Kun-hye's being behind Chon leaked from Chon's confidant is worthy of our attention. There may be a danger of wild rumors spreading, since a young woman is involved, but it would not be treated as a scandal against Chon Tu-hwan, as it would in Japan, because of Korea's traditional custom of "predominance of man over woman."

The wife of Chon Tu-hwan is the daughter of an instructor at the Military Academy. How would she be taking such rumors in connection with her husband's official duties?

COPYRIGHT: Shinchosha 1980

9364
CSO: 4105

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

S. KOREA/ECONOMY

BRIEFS

DECLINING ROLE OF EXPORTS--Seoul Oct. 2 (OP)--The role of exports in contributing to Korea's economic growth, production and employment has measurably fallen off. According to a report released Thursday by the Commerce-Industry Ministry, Korea's gross national product jumped 114 percent from 20.9 trillion won at constant prices in 1975 to 44.9 trillion won in 1979, while production induced by exports rose by only 85.7 percent from 4.6 trillion won in 1975 to 8.5 trillion won in 1979. Exports' share in the GNP thus slid from 21.9 percent to 19 percent. The report also shows that the export-related employment per million dollars worth of exports also declined from an average of 324 persons in all industries in 1975 to 188 last year. The decline in such export-led employment is attributed to the effects of technological improvements in production and a growing trend toward capital-intensive industries. [Text] [SK020930 Seoul ORIENT PRESS in English 0110 GMT 2 Oct 80]

ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SOURCES--Seoul Oct. 6 (OP)--The Korean Government plans to enact a law encouraging the development of substitute energy sources such as solar heat, wind power and methane gas. Energy-resource Ministry officials said Monday that the proposed legislation is necessary to encourage firms to develop such energy sources by giving them tax favors and other financial and administrative support in order to reduce Korea's heavy dependence on oil. In view of the steadily rising oil prices, the economic feasibility of such substitute energy projects is improving, the officials said, although it seems slim at present because of the huge capital requirements. Meanwhile, the ministry has decided to convert the country's six oil-burning cement plants to the use of bituminous coal by 1983 as part of its policy to reduce dependence on oil. The decision is designed to cut Korea's bunker C oil consumption by 12.5 million barrels a year beginning with 1984. The proposed substitution of coal will require a capital investment of more than 91.7 billion won (148 million U.S. dollars), of which the government will subsidize 75 billion won (121 million dollars), according to the officials. [Text] [SK060852 Seoul ORIENT PRESS in English 0735 GMT 6 Oct 80]

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

LARGE LPG STOCKPILE FACILITIES--Seoul Oct. 3 (OP)--The Korean Government is to set up large facilities to stockpile one million tons of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) a year at a port near the Yochon industrial complex on the southern coastal area, while seeking more imports of LPG in an effort to diversify imported energy sources. Seoul's economic ministers Friday approved an Energy-resources Ministry plan for the facilities, which will cost 60 billion won (about 97 million U.S. dollars) in domestic capital by the end of 1982. Energy-resources Ministry officials said that an agreement had been already concluded under which Petromin, a Saudi Arabian state-run oil company, is to supply 250,000 tons of LPG annually to Korea, beginning in 1982. The officials also said that they would vigorously seek more imports of LPG and other energy sources to reduce Korea's heavy dependence on oil. [Text] [SK030241 Seoul ORIENT PRESS in English 0126 GMT 3 Oct 80]

STATE OF SMALL-MEDIUM BUSINESSES--Seoul (OP-Kyodo)--A protracted economic slump has forced an increasing number of Korea's small and medium-size enterprises to suspend or curtail operations or to close down completely. A Commerce-Industry Ministry report released Saturday showed that 68.5 percent of the country's total small and medium-size enterprises were operating normally as of the end of July, compared with 77 percent in 1979 and 85.5 percent in 1978. [Text] [Tokyo THE JAPAN TIMES in English 7 Oct 80 p 5]

CSO: 4120

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

S. KOREA/FOREIGN RELATIONS

ROK UNWILLING TO DISCLOSE COMPLETE TEXT ON KIM'S TRIAL

Tokyo THE JAPAN TIMES in English 7 Oct 80 p 4

[Text]

A Foreign Ministry source disclosed Monday that South Korean authorities object to handing the Japanese government the full text of the general court martial ruling sentencing dissident leader Kim Dae Jung to death on Sept. 17.

The source said the Japanese government, through official diplomatic channels, had asked the South Korean government for a copy of the full text.

Kim Dae Jung was abducted apparently by South Korean intelligence agents in August 1973 from a Tokyo hotel to Seoul. The dispute stemming from what the Japanese government claimed to be the Korean government's violation of Japan's sovereignty was settled politically later that year.

Asked for the full text later by the Japanese government, the South Korean government

repeatedly replied that the full text was in the process of compilation.

The Foreign Ministry has recently obtained information that the full text has been completed.

However, because of fierce opposition from South Korean authorities, there is a strong likelihood that the Japanese government may not be able to obtain the full text after all and will be given only an unofficial briefing by the South Korean authorities, the source said.

Opposition parties are expected to make the Kim Dae Jung case a major issue at the Budget Committee deliberations opening in the Diet Thursday.

The same Foreign Ministry source said Monday that the higher military court will most likely open the appeal trial of Kim late in October.

COPYRIGHT: The Japan Times 1980

CSO: 4120

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

S. KOREA/FOREIGN RELATIONS

BRIEFS

FUKUDA'S REMARKS ON KIM--A statement about the fate of Kim Tae-chung that was reported to have been made by former Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda caused a storm among Liberal-Democratic Party leaders and the press on Thursday. Fukuda reportedly said at a meeting of LDP leaders that President Chon Tu-hwan had told him that Chon was not in a position to mitigate Kim's sentence. Yoshio Sakurauchi, secretary-general of the LDP told the press after the meeting that this was what Fukuda had said. Later, however, Sakurauchi called the press again and said that Fukuda had intended to make the points that President Chon did not want to intervene in the affairs of justice at this moment and that Chon had not said anything about mitigating Kim's sentence. Fukuda's statement, as it was reported by Sakurauchi the first time could have become a diplomatic bomb. It is very rare that a statement made in a meeting of LDP leaders and announced to the press is corrected at a second press conference. Under South Korean law, the president can mitigate a sentence after the Supreme Court has given its final verdict. The LDP meeting was held so that Fukuda could report on his recent trip to the Republic of Korea. [Text] [Tokyo ASAHI EVENING NEWS in English 3 Oct 80 p 3]

MEETING WITH INDIAN AMBASSADOR--Seoul Oct. 2 (OP)--Korea's Foreign Minister No Sin-yong Thursday met with Indian Ambassador to Korea Vasant Vasudeo Paranjpe. No explained the current situation on the Korean Peninsula and asked for the Indian Government's support in connection with Pyongyang's recent diplomatic offensive toward the non-aligned countries, ministry officials said. [Text] [SK021000 Seoul ORIENT PRESS in English 0115 GMT 2 Oct 80]

CSO: 4120

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

N. KOREA/SOCIAL CONDITIONS

JAPANESE VISITOR REPORTS ON LIFE IN DPRK, POLITICAL SITUATION

Tokyo MAINICHI SHIMBUN in Japanese 24, 25, 26 Aug 80

[Article by Akira Ishikawa: "On Our Visit to North Korea"]

[24 Aug 80 p 1]

[Text] High Level Citizen Life; People's Traditional
Customs Remain

Northern side of the Korean peninsula. I had the opportunity to observe the rarely visited Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea). What do the people think; how do they live? This is the report.

Fowl Provided for Nutritive Supply

Kim T'aek-song, descending from the stage, said laughingly, "I receive a cabinet member's level salary. A car is furnished. Three fowl daily for nutritional supply." During the circus, he gives a unique "artistic sleight of hand show," and holds title to the honored name of people's actor." Since the abundance of a livelihood cannot be measured by the standards of capitalist society because the ratio which real goods (home, fuel and the like) occupy in compensation for work in socialist countries is large, Mr Kim did not tell us the definite amount of this monthly salary. But satisfaction with life was inferred by the expression of not only him, but also of the many movie actors and artists this reporter met. In the case of painters, they can display their products at exhibitions and sell them. It is possible for men of letters and artists to act as "professionals." When these facts are heard, the balance of spiritual stimulation and material stimulation, which is one of the difficult problems in socialist policy, seems to be rather well adjusted.

The population of North Korea is 17 million, but it has a military force of more than 500,000. It is said that the defense expenditure burden has

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

limited the improvement of the national standard of living. Despite this, national annual income rose from 1,000 dollars per capita in 1974 to 1,920 dollars in 1979. (President Kim Il-song's "New Year's Address") This considerably exceeds the figures presumed by the West; and when one walks through Pyongyang and sees the people's clothing, the feeling grows that "they have achieved a fairly high level of living." Of course, the women who clean the streets and construction workers wear working clothes, but pedestrians are surprisingly well dressed and well groomed. And this is the norm. I visited the family of So Yong-kyu (45 years old) who lives in an apartment facing a main street in Pyongyang, and saw their way of life.

Mr So is a worker at a thermoelectric powerplant; his monthly salary is 130 won (1 won is approximately 150 yen). Cho Se-pok, his wife (43 years old, works at a library and her monthly salary is 85 won. So the family income exceeds 200 won. There are 3 children, headed by the 17-year old eldest son. Mrs Cho said, "Household expenses, electricity, gas and everything included, are 3 won per month. (In winter, 4 won.) There is no tax, and life is comfortable. Seven or 80 won per month is enough." If so, it works out that half of the salary remains, but the wife says, "It would be good to save, but there are various other expenses." When relatives or friends get married, a money gift is given. "In the case of a close relative or close friend, 300 to 500 won is sent." This amount is a large sum of money equivalent to several times the monthly salary of one person. It is a traditional custom in Korea to pay one's respects at a wedding or funeral--I understood from the wife that the national characteristic of "treating human relationships as important" has remained in life in this form.

Apartment--Four Rooms, Dining, Kitchen

For example, in a room in the four-room plus dining and kitchen apartment where Mr So's family lives, there is a television; and at first glance, it is no different than a room in a Japanese apartment. But, the floor is ondol style which has been in Korea since early times. The wife stated, "The remaining heat from the neighboring thermoelectric powerplant heats the ondol. After all, life is good with the ondol where heat is transmitted from below." National customs are honored even when it comes to eating habits. Looking at the grocery stores lined up on the first floor of the apartment complex, kim-chee which the Koreans love is a best seller. Since it is not the season for Chinese cabbage, cabbage is used as the ingredient and is sold for 0.2 won per kilogram.

Since early times, the Korean people have made kim-chee in their own homes and each has enjoyed his own "individual seasoning." Now the number of people living in apartments has increased and they are satisfied to buy "prepared foods" in the grocery stores.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[25 Aug 80, p 2]

[Text] Aiming at Sovereign Independence. In the "Valley" of Intense Sino-Soviet Confrontation

The Mansudae Theater in the central part of Pyongyang is a large theater built unsparingly of marble. There are many people who say with admiration, "Such a superb theater is rare even in Western Europe." In front of the building there is an eye-catching, large fountain--around it there are honored guests from foreign countries and diplomats from various nations who live in Pyongyang, enjoying the moments before the commencement of the performance. When such a spectacle is seen, the feeling is conveyed that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) has remarkably improved its position in the international community.

Still "A State of War"

North Korea has diplomatic relations with more than 100 nations and about 20 countries have embassies in Pyongyang. It has sent observers to the United Nations and has participated in many United Nations special agencies, but it can never be said that the international environment surrounding this country is favorable to North Korea. First of all, with the cease-fire line in between, the "state of war" with the United Nations forces, composed mainly of United States troops, has still not been terminated. At Panmunjom, the soldiers of the people's army glare at the U.S. soldiers to the south and mutter, "We ought to quickly conclude a peace agreement with the United States and be done with this 'cease-fire.'" This situation not only impedes the path to north-south unification, but forces North Korea, which is in a hurry to build up its economy, to "increase its national defense expenditures."

Secondly, it borders the big powers of China and the USSR. During the Korean war, both China and the USSR gave full-scale support and since then, have respected North Korea's diplomatic line. However, in the midst of the intensification of the Sino-Soviet confrontation, it is difficult for North Korea with a population of 17 million to adhere to an autonomous diplomacy. This reporter asked Kim Yong-nam, director of the International Affairs Department of the Korean Workers' Party about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, but there was no reply. North Korea criticized the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia as "domination doctrine," but there was no formal comment of the Afghanistan affair. Not only that, but nothing was said about the so-called "self-defense counterattack" when Chinese troops acted against Vietnam in February of last year. It seems odd that North Korea, which has a predisposition to theoretically explain everything, did not express its opinion concerning these two incidents which attracted the world's attention. In this, North Korea's delicate position of being placed in the middle of the intense Sino-Soviet confrontation was brought into bold relief.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Those involved in Pyongyang's diplomatic relations point out, "If it joins one camp its sovereignty is damaged. A very good example is the relationship of South Korea with the United States." Isn't the way out of this present difficulty contained in the one aim of nonalignment diplomacy with which North Korea has grappled in its nationwide attitude for these last several years? In its long past history, North Korea has tasted the misery of losing its "sovereignty and independence" when it was oppressed by China and colonialized by Japan. Many of the non-aligned nations have the same kind of intense allergic reaction to outside control--on the basis of this "kindred spirit," North Korea has appealed to solidarity with the nonaligned nations and made the appeal that "overthrowing 'big powerism,' is the road to protecting peace."

Post-Tito Leader

I have heard the words again and again that "our respected President Kim Il-song will be the center of the movement of post-Tito nonalignment diplomacy." It is worthy of note that the visits to Pyongyang by the leaders of the Third World countries has increased more and more. Animals from many countries, including the two pandas from China, have been sent to the zoo in the Taesongsan Amusement Park in suburban Pyongyang. Besides the friendly nations of Eastern Europe, such as Poland, those sending animals are overwhelmingly Third World countries, such as Tanzania, Somalia, Madagascar, Mali, Guinea, Rwanda, Indonesia and Thailand. There is speculation that North Korea is steadily trying to strengthen its bilateral relations.

From such a situation, it is thought that North Korea which has such pressing problems as the outstanding question of improving relations with the United States and with Japan is concentrating its energies on the nonalignment movement and is trying to seek solutions to all of its problems with its cultivated "autonomy" as the lever.

[26 Aug 80, p 3]

[Text] Indestructible Unification System. Harsh Conditions.
First, Nationbuilding

Pyongyang is now bubbling with excitement since the sixth party congress of the Workers' Party of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) to be held in October is close at hand. All over the city, banners written in Korean characters (Hangul), "Success in the Party Congress," catch one's eye. On the occasion of important events in socialist countries, a feeling of mission often rises up with the crisis consciousness of "whatever is not accomplished is irrevocable" as the background. North Korea has experienced that many times in the past, such as the Chollima movement. But the Pyongyang authorities are saying that the "people's enthusiasm this time is the highest ever."

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The slogan of the unfolding movement is the "100 days battle"--which means that during the 100 days from July until the party congress begins, all the workers in industry and agriculture will labor energetically and assiduously in their production, and will exceed the goals of the Second 7-Year Plan.

"Stable Environment"

North Korea has furthered an economic buildup since liberation. North Korea has been hit by the worsening environment of the world economy surrounding the energy problem, and its nonfulfillment of foreign debts has also become a topic of conversation. But concerned parties have declared, "A general overview indicates a steady course." Those in charge of policy are bullish, saying, "The weather is abnormal this year, but agricultural production will be favorable." Grain, which was 9 million tons last year, will be 9.5 million tons this year. Industrial production is also favorable."

Those concerned with the economy state, "There are no oil resources in our country. So, most of our energy is dependent on coal." They state with pride, "We put emphasis on coal even when it was possible to import oil cheaply." Oil is imported from China, the USSR and the Middle East; it can be said that this is North Korea's weak point, just like Japan. However, since thermoelectric powerplants use all coal as fuel, and demand for oil is controlled to a minimum, there is no concern at all. The 100 days battle has been advanced within such a "stable environment." The problem is what are the people of North Korea expecting concretely from the sixth party congress.

Many people are thinking that "important domestic and foreign policies which will become guides of the future will be decided at this congress." Some university students state that "we think that important policies concerning the unity of our homeland, our deepest desire, will be forthcoming."

In the West, there is the opinion that President Kim Il-song's son, Kim Chong-il, will be appointed to an important post at the sixth party congress and a successor system will be established. Kim Chong-il is the influential person leading the Three Revolutions Teams (ideology, culture, technology) and it is said that for several years he has been recognized as "the successor" within the country. However, North Korea has not formally explained Kim Chong'il's position to the outside. No matter what country, the problem of a successor is a difficult question, and speculation has arisen with regard to the question of whether "the more competent the acting highest leader is and the more the unification structure is well ordered, the more the person who inherits the position will be able to skillfully control policies as ever."

In addition, there is the criticism from those opposed to the position of North Korea that "political power is personalized."

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Preparations for Next Generation

However, this reporter did not see the name nor picture of Kim Chong'il no matter where we traveled, such as factories, farms and homes. What did come to our attention were the words, "the guidance of our great President Kim Il-song." Confirmation of the position of successor would signify the existence of a number two. If so, there is the possibility that unification leadership would be weakened. In order for North Korea to weather severe domestic and foreign situations and to advance its nationbuilding, it is thought that the resolution was made not to demolish the unification system of the "respected President Kim Il-song." Despite this, political preparations for the next generation are necessary, but it is uncertain whether or not "conclusions" concerning this will be forthcoming at the sixth party congress. Every day the people of Pyongyang are throwing themselves wholeheartedly into completion of the 100 days battle without the least regard for such concerns of the West.

COPYRIGHT: Mainichi Shimbunsha 1980

9400
CSO: 4105

END

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY